HUME'S IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNECTION: A POSITIVE VIEW AGAINST THE TRADITIONAL MISUNDERSTANDING

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ABSTRACT

Commentaries on Hume have been flourished excessively and sometimes exceedingly because of its importance and necessity. One of the most important aspects of his philosophy is the critique of traditional view of causality. The present work is an attempt to have a clear understanding of the most controversial aspect of Hume's epistemology, i.e, his view of causation. The study focuses a purely philosophical analysis of theoretical issues, it uses qualitative method of analyzing and interpreting concepts. In order to derive data, the researcher uses Hume's works as primary sources and important writings on Hume's causation secondary sources. And few peripheral readings are also used for the argument. Hume attempted to reject the rationalists' view of necessary connection between cause and cause as a logical bond. He accepts that there is a real connection but not logical connection. The connection can be understood not by intuition or demonstration but by another source. Hume never rejects that there is connection between the cause and effect.

Keywords: Causation, Cause and Effect, Hume's Philosophy, Traditional View

INTRODUCTION

Hume's philosophy has been studied from different point of views particularly since 19th century. Commentaries on Hume have been flourished excessively and sometimes exceedingly because of its importance and necessity. One of the most important aspects of his philosophy is the critique of traditional view of causality. The present work is an attempt to have a clear understanding of the most controversial aspect of Hume's epistemology, i.e, his view of causation. Most of the commentators like Duccasse, Whitehead and others have the conviction that Hume denied causal connection, especially the idea of necessary connection. In order to prove it, they held strongly Hume's logic of copy principle and claimed that Hume had an antipathy towards the idea of necessary connection. This interpretation of Hume reflects serious misunderstanding of his theory of causation. However, I do not agree with this view and I would like to present a positive view about Hume's theory of causation. In this work, I agree that rejecting the traditional view, Hume establishes an alternative principle of causality.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

- To simplify the basic principles of Hume's philosophy of causation
- To connect Hume's first principle to his idea of necessary connection
- To prove that Hume agrees the effect follows the cause.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Even Hume lived centuries ago, debating on Hume's philosophy still are being continued. The earlier works such as Norman Kemp Smith's 'The Philosophy oh David Hume: A Critical Study of its origins and Central doctrines' Huxley's 'Hume' are

considered earlier interpretations on Necessary connection. Earlier works interpret that Hume denies the necessary connection between the cause and effect. Later Beauchamp & Reosenberg's 'Hume and the problem of causation', Brown's Inquiry into the Relations of Cause and Effect', Strawson Galen's 'The Secret Connexion: causation, Realism and David Hume' Angela' 'Hume's Theory of Causation and Helen Beebee's 'Hume on causation' can be considered some latest works on Hume's causation. Even though they explained differently from the traditional interpretation, they did not emphasize the inevitable ties between the cause and effect.

METHODOLOGY

Since the paper focuses a purely philosophical analysis of theoretical issues, it uses qualitative method of analyzing and interpreting concepts. In order to derive data, the researcher uses Hume's works as primary sources and important writings on Hume's causation secondary sources. And few peripheral readings are also used for the argument.

DATA ANALYSIS AND ARGUMENT

The sources are taken from his original works to prove the idea of necessary connection rather than secondary sources. Mainly his major works; <u>Treatise</u> and <u>Inquiry</u> are scrutinized. In addition, His <u>Dialoques</u>, <u>Letters to his friend</u> and <u>Abstract</u> are also quoted where necessary. The data from mainly from primary sources and secondary sources are analyzed to prove the positive approach of Hume's concept on 'necessary connection'.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

- 1. Hume attempted to reject the rationalists' view of necessary connection between cause and cause as a logical bond.
- 2. He accepts that there is a real connection but not logical connection.
- 3. The connection can be understood not by intuition or demonstration but by another source.
- 4. Hume never rejects that there is connection between the cause and effect.

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